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The Bankruptcy Act of 1984:
Marathon Revisited
On June 29, 1984, after two years of vigorous debate, Congress
passed the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of
1984,1 an Act that it hoped would resolve a continuing controversy
over the bankruptcy system. The impetus for the new Act was the
Supreme Court's 1982 holding in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v.
Marathon Pipeline Co. 2 that certain provisions of the Bankruptcy Re-
form Act of 1978 were unconstitutional. Despite this recent con-
gressional amendment, however, serious constitutional and
practical problems persist. A constitutional challenge appears inevi-
table: one that will force the Court to revisit the legal issues first
raised in the Marathon case. But reconsideration of the 1984 Act
may not be limited to the courts. Practical difficulties resulting from
the Act's convoluted two-tiered structure could well force Congress
again to reassess the organization of the bankruptcy system.
I. History of the Bankruptcy Controversy
The central issue in the Supreme Court's decision in Marathon,
and the subject of continuing controversy concerning the bank-
ruptcy courts, is whether to ground judicial authority to adjudicate
bankruptcy claims and related issues in Article I or Article III of the
Constitution. An "Article I" court is one that is created by Con-
gress for special situations through its legislative powers as defined
pursuant to one of its enumerated powers in Article I of the Consti-
tution. In contrast, an "Article III" court is one fully within the defi-
nition of the judiciary as provided by Article III of the Constitution.
It must be totally independent; thus, the judges must enjoy, among
other things, lifetime tenure and protection against salary
1. The 1984 Act consists of three major sections: Title 1 creates a new bankruptcy
court system; Title 2 creates 85 additional Article III district court and court of appeals
judgeships, with forty of these positions to be appointed in 1984 and forty-five to be
appointed in the following year; and Title 3 amends several sections of the U.S. Bank-
ruptcy Code, including sections on consumer credit, grain storage facility bankruptcy,
and the procedure for rejecting collective bargaining agreements in reorganization
cases. See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeships Act of 1984, 130 CONG.
REC. H7471 (daily ed. June 29, 1984). President Reagan signed the bill on July 10,
1984, despite his objection to various provisions. Reagan found the limitation on the
number ofjudges he could appoint during his first term in office particularly objectiona-
ble. N. Y. Times, July 11, 1984, at D12, col. 6.
2. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
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diminution.3
Until 1978, federal district courts had jurisdiction over bank-
ruptcy issues, but bankruptcy "referees" were employed to under-
take the preliminary considerations of most day-to-day bankruptcy
disputes. This allocation of authority resulted in two major struc-
tural problems. First, the bankruptcy court operations were ham-
pered both administratively and substantively because the
bankruptcy court was not independent, but was "under the supervi-
sion of an unconcerned district court."4 This lack of independence
caused problems in a number of areas. A primary difficulty was that
the bankruptcy judges did not have control over their clerks and
staff, their office space, and their office equipment or furnishings.
With regard to their law clerks, for example, the district court
judges had priority, with the official Clerk of each district court al-
lowed to hire and fire bankruptcy clerks and assign them to
whatever tasks were pressing at the district court, regardless of the
wishes of the bankruptcy judges and the necessity for bankruptcy
work to be performed. Moreover, bankruptcy judges had little input
into the budgeting process, often could not participate in decision-
making processes affecting their courts, and even had limited access
to legal libraries necessary for completion of their duties. 5 The leg-
islative history of the 1978 Act reveals the result of these discrepan-
cies in the system:
The lack of independence, both judicial and administrative, has seri-
ously weakened the bankruptcy bench. The position of the bankruptcy
judge beneath the district court has led to a serious morale problem
among sitting bankruptcy judges, and a serious decline in the prestige
and attractiveness of the job of bankruptcy judge. . . . IT]his
subordinate position of the bankruptcy court has generated disrespect
3. 458 U.S. at 59.
4. H. R. REP. No. 598, 95th Cong., 2d. Sess. 5, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 5963, 5965.
5. Id. at 5976-77. Among the decision-making processes from which the bankruptcy
judges were excluded were the Judicial Conference activities to determine administra-
tive matters, such as the Judicial Conference Bankruptcy Committee. Id. at 5977. With
regard to the inadequate access to legal libraries, the House Report cited to a letter from
Referee Saul Seidman, President, National Conference of Referees in Bankruptcy, to
Judge Edward Weinfeld, Chairman, Judicial Conference Bankruptcy Committee, June
13, 1972, at 1, 3, which, in summary, reported:
The quality of bankruptcy judges' decisions suffers as a result. They are less able to
be aware of the precedents, and thus less able to decide cases in light of develop-
ments in other bankruptcy courts. Litigants receive second-class justice as a result.
This diminishes the faith in the bankruptcy system, and confirms the concept of the
bankruptcy court as less than a full-fledged court, contrary to the stated goals of
providing fair and qualified tribunals to bankruptcy litigants.
Id. at 5978 fn. 95.
232
Vol. 3:231, 1984
Bankruptcy Act of 1984
for it as an institution, which causes attorneys to avoid the system,
even at great cost, and creditors, with millions of dollars at stake, to
doubt the legitimacy of the operation and decisions of the bankruptcy
court.6
A second structural problem with the bankruptcy system was that,
since the bankruptcy referee was forced to take an active role super-
vising and administering the bankruptcy cases, it was difficult for the
referee to remain unbiased in his adjudicative role. The close in-
volvement essential to proper administration by necessity prevented
the detachment required of a neutral judge. As pointed out in the
legislative history: "No matter how fair a bankruptcy judge is, his
statutory duties give him a certain bias in a case, and the bankruptcy
court as a result has been viewed by many as an unfair forum." 7
The structural flaws in the bankruptcy system were certainly un-
derstandable, considering that the substantive law of bankruptcy
had been formulated in 1898, "in the horse and buggy era of con-
sumer and commercial credit," with its last overhaul in 1938.8 Once
the Great Depression had passed, bankruptcy disappeared from the
public view, and the system fell into disrepair. With the develop-
ment of the consumer credit industry, and the expansion of com-
mercial credit which accompanied the adoption of the Uniform
Commercial Code in the early 1960s, the capabilities of the old
bankruptcy laws were stretched to their breaking point.9 The need
for a massive reworking of the system was readily apparent.
In response to these inherent difficulties in the antiquated bank-
ruptcy system, Congress created the Commission on the Bankruptcy
Laws of the United States in 1970, to evaluate and propose changes
in the bankruptcy laws.' 0 The final report of the Commission, sub-
mitted in 1973, expressed the need for a bankruptcy court system
functionally independent from the district courts," and recom-
mended a separate Article I Bankruptcy Court modeled after the
6. Id. at 5978.
7. Id. at 5965-66.
8. Id. at 5965.
9. Id. The House Report stated: "Both substantive and administratively the bank-
ruptcy system is straining on all sides to handle situations that the framers of the current
law never dreamed would occur."
10. The Commission was established by Pub. L. 91-354, Act of July 24, 1970, 84
Stat. 468 and consisted of nine members. Three were appointed by the President; two
each were appointed by the Speaker of the House, the President of the Senate, and the
Chief Justice. H. R. REP. No. 598, supra note 4, at 5963-64 n.l.
11. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.
R. Doc. No. 137, pt. I, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), cited in S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5801 n. 1.
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U.S. Tax Court.' 2 The House Subcommittee on Civil and Constitu-
tional Rights held hearings on the bankruptcy issue beginning in
1975,13 and in 1977 reported out a bill that established an Article III
court patterned after the existing district court system.14 Following
the Judiciary Committee's favorable action on the bill, the House
passed similar legislation, H.R. 8200.15 However, the Senate
adopted a conflicting bill, S. 2266, which called for a "hybrid court
consisting of an article I bankruptcy trial court appended to an arti-
cle III court of bankruptcy appeals."' 6 Congress passed a compro-
mise package in 1978 that included the Senate's hybrid structure for
the new Bankruptcy Court.1 7
The 1978 Act granted the new Bankruptcy Court jurisdiction over
all "civil proceedings arising under title 11 [the Bankruptcy title] or
arising in or related to cases under title 11."'1 This delegation of trial
authority to Article I rather than Article III judges was successfully
challenged in the courts, with a plurality of the Supreme Court in
Marathon holding the delegation unconstitutional. The plurality
concluded that the Act impermissibly removed most, if not all, of
the "essential attributes" of the judicial power of Article III courts
and vested it in Article I bankruptcy adjuncts.' 9 The decision made
12. The United States Tax Court was created by the Tax Reform Act of 1969. Pub.
L. No. 91-172, Sec. 951, 83 Stat. 730, amending I.R.C. § 7441. See Dubroff, The United
States Tax Court: An Historical Analysis, 41 ALB. L. REV. 1 (1977).
13. In addition to considering the Commission's proposal, the Subcommittee also
reviewed an alternative proposal submitted by the National Conference of Bankruptcy
Judges, which was inconsistent with major provisions of the Commission's bill. H. R.
REP. No. 595, supra note 4, at 5964.
14. See Report of the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House
Committee on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d sess., (committee print 13, Jan. 1978), cited
in S. REP. No. 989, supra note 9, at 5802 n.4.
15. For discussion of the House legislation's proposed establishment of an Article
III bankruptcy court, see H. R. REP. No. 595, supra note 4, at 5972.
16. For discussion of the Senate legislation's proposed establishment of an Article I
bankruptcy court, see S. REP. No. 989, supra note 9, at 5802. In supporting its proposal,
the Senate Report cited to Cyr, Structuring a New Bankruptcy Court: A Comparative Analysis,
52 AM. BANKR. L.J. 141 (1978).
17. The Bankruptcy Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1979).
18. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1471(b) (1976 ed., Supp. IV) (emphasis added). In Marathon, the
Supreme Court pointed out:
Although the Act initially vests this jurisdiction in district courts, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1471(a) (1976 ed., Supp. IV), it subsequently provides that "[t]he bankruptcy
court for the district in which a case under title 11 is commenced shall exercise all of
the jurisdiction conferred by this section on the district courts," § 1471(c) (1976
ed., Supp. IV) (emphasis added). Thus the ultimate repository of the Act's broad
jurisdictional grant is the bankruptcy courts.
458 U.S. at 54 n. 3.
19. 458 U.S. at 84. Justice Brennan wrote the plurality opinion, which was joined by
Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens. Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice
O'Connor, concurred in the judgment, but argued that the decision should be limited to
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clear that the 1978 hybrid structure was impermissible, and that
Congress would have to hammer out another agreement.
Following the Marathon decision, the Judicial Conference of the
United States submitted an interim rule to the eleven Judicial Coun-
cils of the Circuits providing for the continuing operation of the
bankruptcy system. 20 Essentially, the rule revived the pre-1978 sys-
tem in which the district courts referred bankruptcy cases to Bank-
ruptcy Courts, but the district court retained authority to enter any
final order on issues only "related to" bankruptcy. 2' Moreover, a
bankruptcy referral could be withdrawn by the district court for any
reason. The legitimacy of the interim rule, while repeatedly chal-
lenged, has been consistently upheld by district and circuit courts. 22
Congress finally passed a revised Bankruptcy Act on June 29,
1984. In essence, the new Act codifies the interim rule, vesting ju-
risdiction in district courts and relegating the bankruptcy judges to
the stature of adjuncts of the district courts.23 Congress again de-
the specific facts of the case, a contract claim arising under state law. According to Jus-
tice Rehnquist, "Marathon has simply been named defendant in a lawsuit about a con-
tract, a lawsuit initiated by appellant Northern after having previously filed a petition for
reorganization under the Bankruptcy Act." 458 U.S. at 89. Chief Justice Burger and
Justice White filed dissenting opinions. Justice White, in a dissent joined by Chief Jus-
tice Burger and Justice Powell, stated:
We are, on the whole, a body of generalists. The addition of several hundred
specialists may substantially change, whether for good or bad, the character of the
federal bench.
458 U.S. at 118. He added that Congress may have desired to retain flexibility in case
there was a reduced need for bankruptcy judges in the future. As such, Justice White
wished to defer to congressional judgment. Since there was no majority opinion in Mar-
athon, considerable uncertainty remains as to what authority the decision has.
20. See White Motor Corporation v. Citibank, 704 F.2d 254, 256 (6th Cir. 1983) (dis-
cussing the interim rule). To allow Congress an opportunity to respond to the Marathon
decision, the Supreme Court stayed its judgment until October 4, 1982. 458 U.S. at 88.
Congress extended four stop-gap authorizations to the Bankruptcy Courts, while it
worked on the new legislation. N. Y. Times, June 30, 1984 at 38, col. 5.
21. White Motor Corporation v. Citibank, 704 F.2d at 256-57. The Marathon deci-
sion concentrated primarily on the 1978 Act's grant ofjurisdiction to decide cases that
were "related to" bankruptcy cases, rather than on those that would arise under the
bankruptcy laws. 458 U.S. at 54.
22. Several bankruptcy judges interpreted the Marathon decision to have declared
that the 1978 Act's jurisdiction provisions were unconstitutional, thus leaving the dis-
trict courts without the jurisdiction to refer matters to the bankruptcy judges under the
new rule. See, e.g., In re Seven Springs Apartments, 33 B.R. 458 (Bkrtcy. N.D. Ga. 1983);
In re Conley, 26 B.R. 885 (Bkrtcy. M.D. Tenn. 1983); Winters National Bank and Trust
v. Schear Group, 25 B.R. 463 (Bkrtcy. S.D. Ohio 1982). Circuit Courts have overwhelm-
ingly rejected this view, however, interpreting Marathon in a much narrower sense. Sub-
sequently, the constitutionality of the interim rule was upheld by the circuit courts. See
Stewart v. Stewart, 741 F.2d 127 (7th Cir. 1984); In re Kaiser, 722 F.2d 1574 (2nd Cir.
1983); White Motor Corp. v. Citibank, 704 F.2d 254; Braniff Airways Inc. v. C.A.B., 700
F.2d 214 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied 103 S.Ct. 2122 (1983).
23. The legislative history of the 1984 Act reveals that Representative Kastenmeier
stated that the House's version of the Act "would codify" the interim rule, explaining:
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bated the creation of Article III judges to sit on bankruptcy cases
but decided to continue with the modification represented by the
interim rule. The debate between Representative Kastenmeier and
Representative Edwards highlighted some of the conflicts that pre-
ceded the passage of the Act.
Representative Kastenmeier, who proposed the amendment to
create adjunct rather than Article III judges, stressed that the deci-
sion to create Article III judges would be irrevocable: "Once we
have created them, we may not extinguish them. . .We can remove
them . . .on grounds of impeachment alone." 24 He went on to
point out that the Act would give the President the largest number
of Article III appointments in U.S. history-227 lifetime judgeships.
Kastenmeier added that "[t]he most fundamental problem" with the
unamended bill, however, was that it would "radically restructure
the Federal court system by granting the powers and privileges of
Article III status to bankruptcy judges."2 5
In contrast, Representative Edwards asserted that "[a]n Article 1
[bankruptcy] court, with splintered jurisdiction, would reverse all
the reforms that [Congress] made in 1978," while it would also res-
urrect "all the problems of divided jurisdiction and [create] totally
new doubtful jurisdictional boundaries." 26 Edwards contended that
these concerns outweighed problems with Article III courts, stating:
Contrary to the myths raised by some, an Article III bankruptcy court
would not elevate bankruptcy judges to the level of district court
judges. As under present law, bankruptcy judges would not be paid
[I]t is virtually identical to the model rule currently in effect, where jurisdiction is
vested in the district courts and the bankruptcy judges act as adjuncts of those dis-
trict courts.
130 CONG. REC. H.1849 (daily ed. March 21, 1984) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier).
During the discussion of the compromise package which was signed into law, Kas-
tenmeier stated that the main provisions of the House proposal relating to the jurisdic-
tion of the bankruptcy court had "been retained in conference." 130 CONG. REC. H7492
(daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier).
24. 130 CONG. REC. H1846 (daily ed. March 21, 1984) (statement of Rep. Kas-
tenmeier).
Other Representatives were much more emphatic about their concerns with regard to
the Presidential power of judicial appointment. Representative Crockett, for example,
explained the implications of creating a new set of life-tenured judges:
I question whether the appointment of more than 200 new Article III judges, with
all of the attendant privileges, including lifetime tenure, by the President would
result in anything other than a new permanently irreducible court system domi-
nated by conservative white male appointees insensitive to civil rights and labor
issues and to the needs of poor and minority citizens.
130 CONG. REC. H1851 (daily ed. March 21, 1984) (statement of Rep. Crockett).
25. 130 CONG. REc. H1846 (daily ed. March 21, 1984) (statement of Rep.
Kastenmeier).
26. Id. at H1847.
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the same as district court judges, would not have the same jurisdiction,
could not be assigned to other Federal district courts as district court
judges may be, and would not have the same personnel and facilities
as district court judges.2 7
Kastenmeier's position ultimately prevailed in the Congress.
Thus, under the 1984 Act, bankruptcy judges are adjuncts who can
issue orders and judgments, but only in cases under Title 11 or
"core proceedings" arising under Title 11 (those cases directly in-
volving bankruptcy issues). For "non-core" proceedings (those
cases merely "related to" Title 11), the bankruptcy courts are lim-
ited to submitting proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law
to the district court, which would then issue any final order after a
de novo review. 2 8
With the passage of the new legislation, Congress hoped to have
effectively and constitutionally reformed the bankruptcy laws. Sup-
porters of the legislation believed Congress had resolved the con-
troversy created by the Marathon decision, since the two-tiered
structure of the 1984 Act was designed to meet the constitutional
requirements laid out in Marathon. The plurality decision could be
read narrowly to invalidate only the delegation of authority to hear
"bankruptcy related" claims to Article I courts. Under this interpre-
tation, the 1984 Act would meet the plurality's objection by permit-
ting de novo review by Article III courts on bankruptcy related
claims.
An examination of the Act, however, reveals that it not only fails
to respond adequately to the constitutional questions, but also cre-
ates practical problems that retard rather than advance prospects
for bankruptcy reform.
II. Constitutional Implications of the 1984 Act
During the debate on the Conference Report of the 1984 bill,
members of Congress continued to raise questions about the poten-
tial constitutionality of the Act. As Representative Edwards claimed:
When H.R. 5174 [the 1984 Act] becomes the law of the land, the
Supreme Court will have to confront the constitutionality of the
course Congress has chosen to take, as it did not confront the interim
rule which kept the courts operating after the stay of the Marathon de-
cision expired. I am convinced that a decision in a case which we may
27. Id.
28. See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, § 157 (b), (c),
and (d), 130 CONG. REc. H7473 (daily ed. June 29, 1984). For a discussion of the defi-
nition of "core proceedings" under the 1984 Act, see infra text accompanying note 34.
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call Marathon II . .. will confirm the original wisdom of the House of
Representatives in 1978 and of the House Judiciary Committee in
1982 and 1983 in establishing a life-tenured bankruptcy court
system.2 9
These remarks serve at the very least to emphasize that the Act's
constitutionality is still an open question. A closer look at the hold-
ing of Marathon lends support to this view.
In the Marathon case, Northern Pipeline Construction filed a peti-
tion for reorganization in 1980 and subsequently sued Marathon
Pipe Line in the bankruptcy court for damages due to alleged
breaches of contract, misrepresentation, coercion and duress. Mar-
athon moved to dismiss the suit on the ground that the 1978 Act
unconstitutionally conferred Article III judicial powers upon bank-
ruptcy judges who lacked life tenure and protections against salary
diminution. The district court granted Marathon's motion, and
Northern Pipeline appealed.
Northern Pipeline advanced two rationales for upholding the con-
stitutionality of the 1978 jurisdictional grant: first, that the estab-
lishment of bankruptcy courts fell within Congress' Article I power
to create legislative courts; and second, that even if the Constitution
required that "non-core" bankruptcy-related issues be adjudicated
in Article III courts, the 1978 Act in fact satisfied this requirement
because the bankruptcy judges were mere adjuncts. Neither argu-
ment was accepted by the plurality. As to the first rationale, the
Court in Marathon clearly limited the ability of Congress to establish
legislative courts to very few circumstances. Traditionally, Congress
could establish such courts only where the legislature has a special
claim ofjurisdiction. 30 The Court found no special reason to permit
Congress to establish legislative courts to adjudicate all matters re-
lated to the bankruptcy laws.31
29. 130 CONG. REC. H7490-91 (daily ed.June 29, 1984). See also comments of Repre-
sentative Sawyer (". . . I am not sure by going the article I route judges instead -of
article III judges . . . that we might not back right into another constitutional prob-
lem.") and Representative Glickman ("... I fear that we have not finally resolved the
constitutional issues facing article I judges and that we probably will revisit this issue in
the next few years; even the Supreme Court may revisit it sooner.") 130 CONG. REC., at
H7493.
30. According to the plurality in Marathon, legislative courts have been allowed only
in such limited circumstances as courts for the Territories and for the District of Colum-
bia (both of which involved "no division of power between the general and state govern-
ments," 458 U.S. at 65, quoting Kendall v. U.S., 37 U.S. 524, 619 (1838)), or for courts
which adjudicate "public rights," defined as matters that could be conclusively deter-
mined by the executive and legislative branches, as opposed to those matters that are
"inherently judicial." 458 U.S. at 67-68.
31. 458 U.S. at 76.
238
Vol. 3:231, 1984
Bankruptcy Act of 1984
The plurality then discussed whether the bankruptcy courts could
be considered as mere adjuncts to Article III courts, and thus satisfy
constitutional requirements. Although the Supreme Court had pre-
viously approved a magistrate system, whereby a district court could
refer certain pretrial motions to a magistrate for initial determina-
tion, the Court noted that the magistrate's "proposed findings and
recommendations were subject to de novo review by the district
court."3 2 Because the functions performed by the bankruptcy "ad-
junct" pursuant to the 1978 Act were not similarly "limited in such a
way that 'the essential attributes' ofjudicial power [were] retained in
the Article III court," the Court invalidated the grant. 33
Because the Marathon Court focused on issues "related to" bank-
ruptcy, and failed to address those issues "arising in" bankruptcy,
the 1984 congressional amendments concentrated on the former.
By vesting in the district court final authority on the "non-core pro-
ceedings," while retaining in the bankruptcy court authority for
"core proceedings," the Act would seemingly comply with the stan-
dards enunciated in Marathon. This compliance is not enough to
validate the 1984 Act, however, because the Act violates other con-
stitutional standards unaddressed by the Marathon Court.
The Court's broad conclusion that there is no "persuasive reason,
in logic, history, or the Constitution" to support legislative courts in
bankruptcy 34 would seem to bar Article I jurisdiction on both
"core" and "non-core" issues. Moreover, the range of issues that
could be raised in "core" bankruptcy proceedings is so broad that
the 1984 grant of authority to bankruptcy courts seems to conflict
with the Court's intentions in Marathon to keep "essential attrib-
utes" of Article III courts from being granted to Article I courts. As
the House Judiciary Committee reported in regard to the powers of
bankruptcy courts prior to the 1978 Act:
The variety of legal issues encountered is almost endless. The Bank-
ruptcy Act [existing prior to 1978] requires application of the broadest
spectrum of other laws governing, for example, taxes, torts, negotiable
instruments, contracts, spendthrift and other trusts, mortgages, con-
veyances, landlord and tenant relationships, partnerships, mining, oil
32. 458 U.S. at 79.
33. 458 U.S., at 79, citing United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980).
"In short," the Court concluded in Marathon, "the ultimate decisionmaking authority
respecting all pretrial motions [in the magistrate system] clearly remained with the dis-
trict court. . . .[Therefore,] the [1978 Federal Magistrates] Act did not violate the con-
straints of Article III." Id.
34. 458 U.S. at 76. The Court stressed that the district court, not the adjunct, had to
have the authority to make "an informed, final determination," which the 1978 Act did
not provide. 458 U.S. at 81.
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and gas extraction, domestic relations, labor relations, insurance, Se-
curities and Exchange Commission statutes, regulations and decisional
law' . ... Bankruptcy courts are frequently confronted with constitu-
tional issues. Much of the decisional law surrounding the requirement
of the fifth amendment with respect to property rights derives from
bankruptcy cases. The courts have also considered issues such as State
sovereignty and federalism; first amendment rights; the scope of the
contracts clause; the jurisdiction and powers of Federal courts; and
legitimacy of congressional grants ofjurisdiction, to name only a few
that have arisen. The issues resolved at the trial level in the bank-
ruptcy court system are myriad. 35
Although the Report did not distinguish between "core" and
non-core" proceedings, it seems likely, considering the broad defi-
nition of "core" proceedings under the Act, that many of these is-
sues would have to be decided by the bankruptcy courts. The 1984
Act, for example, defines "core" proceedings as including, but not
being "limited to," such matters as those concerning the administra-
tion of the estate; counterclaims by the estate against persons filing
claims against the estate; orders in respect to obtaining credit; pro-
ceedings to determine, avoid, or recover fraudulent conveyances;
determinations as to the dischargeability of certain debts; objections
to discharges; and orders approving the use or lease of property,
including the use of cash collateral. 3 6 The range of possible cases
that could arise under the "core" rubric, therefore, is quite broad.
Similarly, the legislative history of the 1984 Act demonstrates that
the intent of Congress was to define "core proceedings" very expan-
sively. Representative Kastenmeier, for example, emphasized in his
discussion of the 1984 Act that only "a narrow category of cases are
not [to] be construed as core proceedings.- 3 7 As a result, it is likely
that the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy judge, even when restricted
by the 1984 Act to "core" proceedings, could still constitute an "un-
warranted encroachment upon the judicial power of the United
35. H. R. REP. No. 595, supra note 4, at 5971-72, quoting Hearings on H.R. 31 and
H. R. 32 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 94th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., pt. 1 at 531 (1975-76).
36. See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, § 157(b)(2),
130 CONG. REC. H7473 (daily ed. June 29, 1984). In addition, the bankruptcy judge is
responsible for determining what is a "core proceeding" in which he or she may issue a
final order. § 157(b) (3). The district court can, however, withdraw any case from the
bankruptcy court for cause shown, although it is not clear what is required to show such
"cause." § 157(d).
37. 130 CONG. REC. H7492 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of Rep. Kas-
tenmeier) (footnotes omitted). In fact, the conference committee, which resolved the
differences between the House and Senate bills, specifically rejected the Senate's at-
tempts to limit the jurisdiction of bankruptcy judges. Id.
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States" of the sort condemned by the Court in Marathon.3"
The widely held perception that district judges are uninterested in
dealing with bankruptcy matters, 39 and therefore reluctant to limit
the authority of bankruptcy judges, may become a factor if the
Supreme Court is called upon to determine the constitutionality of
the 1984 Act. The district judges' perceived reluctance to supervise
bankruptcy judges, or merely to rubber stamp those decisions they
do review, results in a surrender of Article III authority and a corre-
sponding de facto encroachment by bankruptcy judges. Further-
more, the right to appeal the bankruptcy judges' decisions in core
proceedings to the district courts under the 1984 Act may not pro-
vide sufficient protection to satisfy the plurality's concerns in Mara-
thon. Under the Act, the district court can overturn a "core"
decision by a bankruptcy judge only upon finding that the decision
was "clearly erroneous," 40 in contrast to the de novo review allowed
for "non-core" proceedings. Thus, the large majority of core pro-
ceeding decisions are immunized from review. 4'
38. 458 U.S. at 84.
39. See H. R. REP. No. 595, supra note 4, at 5976 ("district judges have long made
clear their lack of interest in bankruptcy matters). In Matter of Wildman, 30 B.R. 133,
154 (Bkrtcy N.D. Ill. 1983), Bankruptcy Judge Merrick asserted that the district and cir-
cuit judges had upheld the interim rule because of their desire "to enable district courts
to delegate their bankruptcy jurisdiction to bankruptcy courts." He accused the judges
who passed upon the rule of acting "unlawfully and unethically" in not recusing them-
selves "because of their recognized bias."
40. See Osborne v. Production Credit Association, No. 84-C-43-C, Slip Op. (W.D.
Wis. Sept. 18, 1984) ("28 U.S.C. § 158 [created under the 1984 Act] ...provides that
appeals from decisions of bankruptcy judges 'shall be taken in the same manner as ap-
peals in civil proceedings generally are taken to the courts of appeals from the district
courts.' 28 U.S.C. § 158(c). Since Rule 52(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, applies
the clearly erroneous standard to appeals taken from district courts to courts of appeals,
the clear implication of both section 158(c) and the special de novo review procedure of
section 157(c)(1) is that Congress intended that the clearly erroneous standard apply in
appeals from decisions of bankruptcy judges in 'core' proceedings.").
This court decision is supported upon evaluating the 1984 Act, which provides in
section 158(a) that "[t]he district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to
hear appeals from final judgments, orders, and decrees . . . of bankruptcy judges..."
Whereas section 157(c)(1) specifies that district courts may conduct a de novo review of
"non-core" proceedings dealt with by bankruptcy judges, no such provision exists with
regard to the appeals allowed from final orders issued by bankruptcy judges in "core"
proceedings. In addition, section 158(c) states:
An appeal under subsections (a) and (b) of this section shall be taken in the same
manner as appeals in civil proceedings generally are taken to the court of appeals
from the district courts and in the time provided by Rule 8002 of the Bankruptcy
Rules.
This makes very clear that the district court is to evaluate decisions of bankruptcy judges
on core proceedings in the same manner as appeals courts normally consider district
court decisions; through a "clearly erroneous" standard.
41. It might be argued that section 157(d) of the 1984 Act-allowing the district to
withdraw any case from the bankruptcy judge "for cause shown" or if it involves a case
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There continues to be much controversy over the constitutionality
of the 1984 Bankruptcy Act.42 The preceding observations are only
suggestive of some of the possible objections to the compromise ar-
rangements developed by Congress in re-authorizing the bank-
ruptcy courts. Because of the on-going debate over the
constitutional validity of the Congressional solution, the bankruptcy
system has been left in a state of confusion.
III. Practical Difficulties of the 1984 Act
In addition to constitutional problems, the congressional decision
to develop an adjunct system for the bankruptcy courts, rather than
to create Article III judges outright, promises to cause severe practi-
cal difficulties in bankruptcy litigation. Because of the two-tiered
structure that now exists (with the district court making all final de-
cisions on non-core proceedings, as well as having to review mo-
tions to withdraw cases from the bankruptcy courts), the parties may
very well be forced to litigate two cases-first in the bankruptcy
court, and again in the district court. This will not only be ex-
tremely costly, but undoubtedly will result in much delay.
Judge Merrick, a bankruptcy judge who threatened to resign in
protest of the 1984 Act, predicted that bankruptcy cases that had
previously taken six months to a year to resolve might now take sev-
eral years.43 Representative Edwards added: "Anytime you have to
go back and forth from one court to another, it's going to be devas-
tating. Many Chapter 11 cases have an urgency about them that
must be respected and this won't happen because they won't be able
to get quick, authoritative decision-making that good business re-
which "requires consideration of both Title 11 and other laws of the United States regu-
lating organizations or activities affecting interstate commerce"--gives the district court
"ultimate authority" over the bankruptcy court, thus meeting Article III requirements.
However, even if a district judge were inclined to exercise this authority, she would have
no authority to do so if the bankruptcy judge was properly issuing final orders for core
proceedings, since there would not be proper "cause." Moreover, the Act's legislative
history indicates that the latter part of the provision, relating to "other laws," was to be
"construed narrowly." 130 CONG. REC. H 1850 (daily ed. March 21, 1984) (statement of
Rep. Kastenmeier). Therefore, bankruptcy judges would still exert significant Article III
powers.
42. Another constitutional objection has recently been raised in regard to the ap-
pointment of bankruptcy judges under the new Act. Officially, the authorization for the
interim bankruptcy system had expired on June 27, 1984, and Congress subsequently
reappointed the bankruptcy judges on June 29, when it passed the 1984 Act. This ex-
tension of bankruptcy judges' terms "may be regarded as Congressional usurpation of
the appointment powers normally reserved to the Government's judicial and executive
branches." N. Y. Times, June 30, 1984, at 35, col. 2.
43. Wall Street Journal, July 13, 1984, at 3, col. 4.
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quires. ' 44 Ironically, an important goal of the 1978 reforms had
been to "enlarge the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court," because,
as the Senate Judiciary Committee explained during its analysis of
the 1978 Act:
[T]he jurisdictional limitations presently imposed on the bankruptcy
courts have embroiled the court and the parties in voluminous litiga-
tion whose sole function is to determine whether the court possesses
the requisite summary jurisdiction to determine the merits of issues
often necessarily heard by the court in determining its jurisdictional
question. Upon a finding that it lacks summary jurisdiction, the bank-
ruptcy court is required to dismiss the action, whereupon it is neces-
sary for the parties to proceed anew with a plenary action in either the
U.S. district court or an appropriate state court to try issues already
substantially tried in the summary proceedings before the bankruptcy
court. Frequently, the liquidation of bankrupt estates and the rehabili-
tation of debtors are significantly prejudiced thereby. 45
The 1978 Act had attempted to overcome such jurisdictional
problems by vesting enhanced authority in the bankruptcy judges.
But, in response to Marathon, the Congress returned to the debilitat-
ing disarray of the earlier system by re-establishing, in the 1984 Act,
a highly complex two-tiered structure.
Moreover, making the bankruptcy judges adjuncts to the district
courts may appear to diminish the prestige of the office. These
problems of delay, confusion and diminished prestige contradict the
basic purposes of the reform movement that led the 1978 Act. As
Edwards explained during debate on the 1984 Act:
The years of study that [led] to the passage of the 1978 bankruptcy law
made clear that the two major failings of the prior bankruptcy referee
system were the lack of simplicity in determining jurisdiction of the
bankruptcy court and the low status and lack of power of the bank-
ruptcy judges which resulted in disrespect for the position and inabil-
ity to attract the best caliber judges. . . . [The 1984 Act, however,]
undoes the court reform accomplished in 1978, makes the pre-1978
jurisdictional system seem simple by comparison, and makes the job of
bankruptcy judge even less attractive than under the pre-1978
system. 46
44. Id. at col. 5 (quoting Rep. Edwards). The results of the Act caused Vern Coun-
tryman, a Harvard Law School professor who specializes in bankruptcy, to call the bill
"the most incompetent piece of legislation around." Id. at col. 4.
45. S. REP. No. 989, supra note 9, at 5803-04.
46. 130 CONG. REC. H7490 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of Rep. Edwards).
Edwards argued that the original position of the House in 1978, calling for the estab-
lishment of Article III bankruptcy judges, was the preferred solution, which "proved
prophetic" when in Marathon the Supreme Court ruled the 1978 compromise to be un-
constitutional. Id.
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The 1984 compromise adopted in response to Marathon appears to
be no more effective than its 1978 predecessor, and may in fact be
even more flawed.
IV. Conclusion
The constitutional infirmities and practical difficulties discussed in
this Comment raise serious questions about the value of the 1984
Bankruptcy Act. While there may have been strong policy and polit-
ical reasons to keep bankruptcy judges under Article I rather than
Article III,4 7 the structure established by the 1984 Amendments se-
riously impedes the practical operation of the bankruptcy system.
Moreover, the rationale behind the Marathon decision would seem
to prohibit the authority granted to the bankruptcy courts, even with
the core/non-core distinctions. Although a narrow reading of Mara-
thon could justify the amendments on their face, the structure may
be unconstitutional in practice because the statutory jurisdictional
limitations may not effectively restrict the scope of adjunct author-
ity. Regardless of whether the Supreme Court is ultimately forced
to rule on the constitutionality of the 1984 Bankruptcy Act, it is
likely that Congress will eventually have to return to the drawing
board in another effort to design a bankruptcy system that is effi-
cient as well as constitutional.
Wendy Lynn Trugman
47. See discussion of the debate between Kastenmeier and Edwards, supra text ac-
companying notes 22-25. Justice White, in his dissenting opinion in Marathon, also
listed several policy reasons for the congressional decision to adopt Article I judges.
These included the concerns that: several hundred bankruptcy specialists added to the
federal judiciary might "substantially change, whether for good or bad, the character of
the federal bench;" that "the existence of several hundred bankruptcy judges with life
tenure would have severely limited Congress' future options;" that "the number of
bankruptcies may fluctuate producing a substantially reduced need for bankruptcy
judges," with'Congress then having to "face the prospect of large numbers of idle fed-
eral judges;" and that "the change from bankruptcy referees to Art. Ijudges [would be]
far less dramatic, and so less disruptive of the existing bankruptcy and constitutional
court systems, than would be a change to Art. III judges." 458 U.S. at 118 (White, J.,
dissenting).
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